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Nomenclature and Abbreviations 
 
AURORAGOLD: NSA program that monitors company communications to identify, exploit, 
and introduce vulnerabilities in cellular networks. 
 
Big Data: Extremely large data sets, not analyzable by traditional data processing 
applications. 
 
DNI: Digital Network Intelligence 
 
DNR: Digital Number Recognition 
 
Fairview: NSA program that collects bulk phone, internet and e-mail data  
 
FOXACID: NSA program that defines potential surveillance targets’ vulnerabilities. 
 
Metadata: Information about the content of data, which makes it easier to analyze large 
quantities of data.  
 
NSA: National Security Administration 
 
PRISM: Planning Tool for Resource Integration Synchronization and Management. Begun in 
2007, PRISM collects stored Internet communications from Internet companies. 
 






Surveillance studies suffer from a near-total lack of empirical data, partially due to 
the highly secretive nature of surveillance programs. However, documents leaked by 
Edward Snowden in June of 2013 provided unprecedented proof of top-secret American 
data mining initiatives that covertly monitor electronic communications, collect, and store 
previously unfathomable quantities of data. These documents presented an ideal 
opportunity for testing theory against data to better understand contemporary 
surveillance. This qualitative content analysis compared themes of technology, privacy, 
national security, and legality in the NSA documents to those found in sets of publicly 
available government reports, laws, and guidelines, finding inconsistencies in the portrayal 
of governmental commitments to privacy, transparency, and civil liberties. These 
inconsistencies are best explained by the risk society theoretical model, which predicts that 






























Surveillance, Dataveillance, Data Mining, 9/11, Qualitative Content Analysis 
 
 
 “Nothing in our past compares to the efforts at distributed mass-surveillance 
that are now underway, which combine the long-standing police impulse to 
expand private-sector information sources with awesome new technological 
capabilities for vacuuming up, storing and keeping track of vast oceans of 
information” (Stanley 2004:3). 
 
“The greatest military power in history shields itself with an anti-missile 
defense system costing billions of dollars. Is it not also a bitter irony that this 
power should be struck to the heart of its security and self-confidence by an 
action that was utterly improbable according to every logic of risk, when 
suicide terrorists succeeded in turning commercial passenger aircraft into 
rockets, which destroyed symbols of American world power? The irony of risk 
here is that rationality, that is, the experience of the past, encourages 
anticipation of the wrong kind of risk, the one we believe we can calculate and 
control, whereas the disaster arises from what we do not know and cannot 
calculate” (Beck 2006:330). 
 
 
Introduction: The NSA Surveillance Programs and Surveillance Literature 
On June 6, 2013, The Guardian published the first of numerous documents 
demonstrating the breadth of the American National Security Administration’s (NSA) 
previously top-secret mass data mining programs. These documents, made available by 
former NSA contractor Edward Snowden and publicized by journalists Glenn Greenwald 
and Laura Poitras, demonstrate the existence of secret electronic surveillance data mining 
initiatives that use the cooperation of major Internet companies to gather information on 
previously encrypted Internet communications, tap into vulnerable domestic and 
international networks, and exploit technological innovations to collect and store 
previously unfathomable amounts of information, all without traditional legal checks and 
balances. The NSA’s programs were implemented in the wake of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks and were ostensibly designed to prevent further terrorist plots. Revelations about 
the programs have revivified debates about surveillance and privacy in the modern age and 
provided the opportunity to empirically analyze contemporary surveillance. This study 
used qualitative content analysis to compare themes within a sample of NSA documents to 
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those found in sets of laws, reports, and guidelines in order to test several hypotheses 
about digital surveillance that were suggested by the literature. The literature review also 
revealed a distinct lack of empirical data in contemporary surveillance literature, and this 
study attempts to at least partially rectify that limitation.  
Despite their lack of data, some common themes do emerge from surveillance 
studies. They generally abound with theory, and they also tend to agree that surveillance 
changed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Prior to those attacks, surveillance law in the 
United States had remained relatively stable for decades (Henderson 2002). During those 
same decades, technology proliferated, facilitating the transfer of information and making 
communications exponentially more traceable. In the commercial sector, this meant that 
the model for making money shifted as businesses moved online. In this new model, the 
traceability of data is invaluable for marketers because the use of big data tracking 
technology enables marketers to construct intricate profiles of consumers and precisely 
target their messages to exactly the people that are most receptive to hearing it. 
Contemporary government surveillance programs use big data in the same way as 
marketers, constructing profiles of targets using data collected through their routine use of 
technology.  
Although technological advances made mass data collection possible, changes to the 
legal system made by the PATRIOT Act enabled the NSA’s data mining programs. The Act, 
drafted in 1995 but passed following the September 11 attacks, loosened restrictions on 
surveillance of suspected terrorists. At the time it passed, scholars argued that it had the 
potential to usher in an unrestricted executive surveillance power (Henderson 2002, 
Stanley 2004). While the Act does contain provisions to protect privacy and in most 
instances merely updated existing law, it has several controversial sections, Sections 203, 
206, and 215 in particular. These sections, which amended the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA), established in 1978 in order to limit “the ability of the executive 
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branch to conduct electronic surveillance for national security purposes” (Henderson 
2002:190), were all controversial at the time Act was passed because of the threat they 
posed to individual privacy. The FISA Act established the FISA Court as way of subjecting 
federal officers investigating secret and potentially sensitive targets to judicial supervision. 
Originally, applications requesting electronic surveillance had to establish probable cause 
“that the target was either a foreign power or the agent of a foreign power” (Henderson 
2002:191) and that the locations of surveillance were used or were about to be used by the 
target of surveillance. Judicial precedent also established that FISA evidence was only 
admissible as criminal evidence if its collection was incidental to intelligence gathering: 
“Information obtained pursuant to FISA could be used in criminal proceedings provided 
that intelligence gathering was the ‘primary purpose’ of the surveillance” (Henderson 
2002:195). All other evidence was subject to more stringent requirements laid out in Title 
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III). Title III requires 
probable cause for governmental interception of wire communications and also mandates 
that “surveillance target[s] have, prior to the introduction of any damaging evidence in a 
criminal proceeding, the opportunity to challenge both the existence of probable cause and 
the conduct of the surveillance” (Henderson 2002:183). However, the PATRIOT Act 
changed the protocols for conducting surveillance enough that it created loopholes that 
enabled the government to collect data virtually unchecked.  
The most controversial sections of the PATRIOT Act were set to expire 5 years after 
passage of the Act, but have been renewed ever since. Section 203 enables government 
agencies to share “foreign intelligence information” but “the definition of foreign 
intelligence information is sufficiently broad that it encompasses virtually anything that 
could be construed as a threat to national security, regardless of whether a U.S. person is 
involved” (Henderson 2002:205). Section 206 gives the government power to engage in 
roving surveillance without an obligation to prove that the target of surveillance even uses 
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the device, enables data mining programs,. Section 215, provides “library records 
permission,” which allows government access to materials potentially relevant to terrorist 
investigations. These sections continue to be controversial because of their apparently 
limitless scope. They also, by relaxing restrictions on surveillance, increase the likelihood of 
monitoring innocent and untargeted individuals.  
While many of actions taken following the 9/11 terrorist attack, including 
detainment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, the invasion of Iraq, and the abuse of 
prisoners of war were well-documented areas of public debate, there was scant evidence of 
governmental surveillance. Certainly there was nothing like the comprehensive archive of 
documents disclosed by Edward Snowden. While the exact number of leaked documents is 
difficult to pinpoint, the NSA estimates that Snowden released 200,000 to 1.7 million 
classified documents (Kelley 2013) to Poitras and Greenwald. Because of the secret nature 
of the program, there had been no prior evidence of its size or scope. Now, a significant 
number of the documents are readily available online, primarily through Glenn 
Greenwald’s website The Intercept, but on other news sites as well.  
The leaked NSA documents present the opportunity to empirically explore post-
9/11 surveillance in America. Most scholars agree that there was a shift in the nature of 
surveillance following the attacks, but there has never been such an abundance of 
documentation of that shift until now. Previously top secret, the NSA program has now 
been so extensively documented—and the leaked documents made so readily available—
that it can serve as a benchmark to test theory against reality and more completely 
understand contemporary surveillance. To that end, this study employs a comparative 
qualitative content analysis to evaluate the NSA documents and better understand post-
9/11 surveillance in America within a sociological framework. Several hypotheses were 
formed based on theoretical arguments found in surveillance studies, and themes within a 
sample of the top-secret NSA documents were tested against themes found in sets of 
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publicly available laws, guidelines, and reports as a method of understanding post-9/11 
surveillance in America. 
Theory 
The literature did suggest several themes, and surveillance literature repeatedly 
addresses key aspects of contemporary surveillance. One key aspect is the role that 
technology plays in surveillance. The effect of technology on surveillance in contemporary 
society has been of interest to surveillance scholars for some time, and visible changes in 
monitoring—the increasing number of recording devices, unprecedented reliance on 
personally identifiable data for verification, and corporate uses of surveillance—have been 
used to form theories of surveillance. In the literature, technology is consistently presented 
as an essential part of modern surveillance that makes surveillance almost unbelievably 
easy, cheap, unobtrusive, and ubiquitous (Marx and Muschert 2007:380). Modern 
technology has also allowed more flexible surveillance. Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. 
Ericson conceptualize modern surveillance as a “surveillant assemblage,” that uses imagery 
that may be more appropriate for modern surveillance than even Foucault’s Panopticon. 
The surveillant assemblage results from the convergence of previously discrete 
surveillance systems that reduces individuals to a set of representative data that are then 
analyzed (Haggerty and Ericson 2000:606). While this trend of networking is one of the 
hallmarks of modern surveillance, information legitimately collected in one arena may 
violate civil rights in another: “Practices that may in some respects be acceptable in one 
[type of application] (say, marketing) may erode rights and deny human dignity in another 
(say, anti-terrorism)” (Lyon 2014:2). 
Most surveillance studies adhere to a postmodernist paradigm, and  
As understood by postmodernists, power is not a top-down, structural entity, 
possessed and wielded exclusively by elites. Rather, it comes from everywhere, even below, 
and is exercised rather than owned (Foucault 1989:177). The majority of surveillance work 
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also owes a debt to Michel Foucault. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault addresses the 
processes that create power, principally discourse and knowledge, also discussing how 
both power and discipline are exercised through a variety of techniques, including 
surveillance (Foucault 1989:27). Technology is suspicious because it not only aids this 
surveillance, but also because it is a tool of power with the potential to oppress and control, 
a theme that also frequently appears in surveillance literature (Haggerty and Ericson 2000; 
Lyon 2004, 2007, 2014; Mann 2012; Willcocks 2006). Foucault’s metaphor of the 
Panopticon also has implications for many areas of interest to surveillance scholars, 
including those of dominance, control, and power.  
Foucault’s Panopticon metaphor demonstrates the necessity of surveillance in 
disciplinary society: “Hierarchized, continuous and functional surveillance may not be one 
of the great technical 'inventions' of the eighteenth century, but its insidious extension 
owed its importance to the mechanisms of power that it brought with it” (Foucault 
1989:176). The brilliance of the Panopticon, a 19th century model prison, as a metaphor is 
the structure’s efficient consolidation of power and control. The Panopticon’s raised central 
tower presented the constant threat of surveillance by unseeable guards. The prison 
population internalized the surveillance they were subjected to and effectively policed 
themselves, internalizing external methods of control regardless of whether a guard was 
actually present. This, Foucault says, is why surveillance is so effective, not only in prisons 
but in schools, factories, and even society at large. Calling it a “multiple, automatic, and 
anonymous power,” Foucault outlines its efficiency: “Its functioning is that of a network of 
relations from top to bottom but also to a certain extent from bottom to top and 
laterally...The power in the hierarchized surveillance of the disciplines is not possessed as a 
thing, or transferred as a property; it functions like a piece of machinery” (Foucault 
1989:176-177). 
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Modern surveillance does mimic the Panopticon in several ways. As in the 
Panopticon, contemporary individuals/consumers willingly facilitate their own 
surveillance. Willcocks (2006) emphasizes that those under surveillance in modern 
Information/control society submit to the disciplinary power exercised through 
technological surveillance and internalize its control over them. Furthermore, a relatively 
small portion of the population enacts this surveillance; the rest of the population lacks the 
means to see reciprocally into the workings of the institutions that monitor their activities. 
Privacy laws increasingly distinguish between data collected on a person and personal 
identity (Lyon 2004), information is a commodity (as in Foucault’s writing people became 
objects) and consumers are increasingly willing to leverage their data for perceived 
rewards (Campbell and Carlson 2002). Just as prisoners in the Panopticon began to believe 
discipline was good for them, modern consumers accept that they are justly compensated 
for the sacrifice of their personal information (Lyon 2004, Campbell and Carlson 2002), 
which is accomplished, as Foucault predicted, by coercion so subtle it is not even felt: “The 
contemporary Panopticon…is a consumer Panopticon based on positive benefits where the 
worst sanction is exclusion” (Campbell and Carlson 2002:592). People accept new 
technology as so essential to their own happiness and self-identity that they willingly 
submit to surveillance.  
Despite the appeal of the disciplinary model, most contemporary surveillance 
scholars point to its shortcomings and have expanded and altered Foucault’s original 
theory to better tailor it to current surveillance. The risk society and control society 
models, for instance, are both rooted in postmodernist theory but are distinct and more 
contemporary sociological frameworks that explain many aspects of present-day society, 
including increasing carceral rates, class inequality, and social monitoring that 
disproportionately affects lower classes, particularly in Western societies that boast 
relatively high levels of security and stability. Foucault’s disciplinary model predicted that 
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these social ills would dissipate in the face of more subtle and internalized civility, and 
more recent theoretical models all seek to explain what actually happened.  
Benoit Dupont argues that there are, “Several architectural incompatibilities 
between nineteenth century prisons and twenty-first century computer networks…The 
distributed structure of the Internet and the availability of observation technologies has 
blurred the distinction between those who watch and those who are being watched” 
(Dupont 2008:259). Dupont identifies two principle trends frequently minimized or 
neglected by surveillance scholars that deserve more scrutiny: the “democratization of 
surveillance” and the “resistance strategies” Internet users have and are adopting to thwart 
this surveillance (Dupont 2008:261). Unlike the Panopticon, which by definition utilizes a 
central hub to enact its surveillance, the Internet was designed to be amorphous and 
decentralized, in order to make it resilient. This design creates an openness paradox: 
“while the technical protocols that underpin the Internet are public and standardized, 
therefore making surveillance relatively easy to carry out, the very same openness 
empowers application writers (programmers), who are free to design and distribute new 
tools of surveillance and resistance” (Dupont 2008:261). In addition, cheap surveillance 
software and hardware is marketed to individuals; the combination of this accessible 
surveillance technology with the proliferation of affordable and free tools for blocking 
surveillance and masking Internet activity has the potential to create unprecedented 
possibilities for citizen rebellion (Dupont 2008). However, the existence of resistance 
strategies does not equate to their widespread use, and their complexity often makes them 
difficult for average users (Greenwald 2014:7-33).  
The study tests two prevailing models of modern surveillance society suggested in 
the literature: the control society model and the risk society model. Control societies 
operate much like modern surveillance society, using technology and the availability of 
data rather than prison to exert control over populations: “Control societies no longer 
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operate, by for example, physically confining people but through continuous control and 
instant communication enabled by developments in material technology (Willcocks 
2006:4). A crucial difference between disciplinary and control societies is that surveillance 
has moved from observation of specific populations to almost haphazard collection of data 
in the quest for relevant information (Lyon 2014:2). Because of the volume of data 
collection, in control societies physical confinement is no longer necessary to control 
society, since the threat of surveillance is felt through the perception of ubiquitous data 
collection (Deleuze 1992:7). Still, the control society model evolved from the disciplinary 
model, and the two are similar. For instance, both caution against understanding power (in 
this case exercised through surveillance) as a top-down, hierarchical venture: 
“Understanding surveillance in the 21st century also entails an analytic move beyond the 
conventional loci of power—the state or the corporation—to discover ways in which all 
sorts of processes, procedures, strategies and tactics help to shape relations and enable or 
constrain activities touched by globalized flows of personal data, from international to local 
community levels” (Lyon 2004:146). In control societies, factories have been replaced by 
corporations, and competition between individuals and corporations is presented as 
healthy and natural, thereby keeping these entities focused on each other, rather than 
mechanisms of control (Deleuze 1992:5). Control societies are also distinguished from 
disciplinary societies by the use of codes; disciplinary societies use numbers or signatures 
to de-individuate people (Deleuze 1992:5). While several aspects of the control society 
model preliminarily appeared to be relevant to contemporary dataveillance, there also 
appear to be discrepancies between that model and contemporary society.  
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 Loic Wacquant proposes that incarceration rates are actually indicative of another 
kind of control in this country. While the disciplinary and control society models both 
predict that surveillance will minimize the need for physical incarceration, Wacquant calls 
incarceration a method of “punitive containment,” not an inexplicable accident, but rather a 
deliberate attempt to contain the increasing number of people marginalized by neoliberal 
policies. He factors modern surveillance and data collection into his argument, and agrees 
with the control society model that both are used to control the increasing number of 
marginalized citizens in neoliberal societies. He points out a seeming contradiction: In an 
increasingly stratified and globalized society, the privileged minority of citizens enjoy 
increased laxity—deregulated financial systems and low rates of prosecution for white 
collar crimes---while impoverished populations are subjected to escalating police 
surveillance and incarceration in place of social assistance programs that were eliminated 
in the neoliberal era (Wacquant 2010). Wacquant therefore repudiates the disciplinary 
model. Contemporary prisons, he says, serve only to contain undesirable populations: 
“Hierarchical classification, elaborate time schedules, nonidleness, close-up examination 
and the regimentation of the body: these techniques of penal ‘normalization’ have been 
rendered wholly impracticable by the demographic chaos spawned by overpopulation, 
bureaucratic rigidity, resource depletion, and the studious indifference if not hostility of 
penal authorities toward rehabilitation” (Wacquant 20120:205). 
The risk society model portrays different motives for modern surveillance than both 
Wacquant and control society theorists, and states that data collection is not an attempt to 
control society but rather prevent future disasters. They even question the possibility of 
control in contemporary society, given the pace of technology, globalization, and inequality: 
“World risk society theory does not plead for or encourage (as some assume) a return to a 
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logic of control in an age of risk and manufactured uncertainties—that was the solution of 
the first and simple modernity. On the contrary, in the world risk society the logic of 
control is questioned fundamentally, not only from a sociological point of view but by 
ongoing modernization itself” (Beck 2000:218). Beck (2000; 2006) argues that risk in 
contemporary society has become inescapable. Data mining programs, which use actuarial 
models to predict risk, reflect larger societal trends, “combin[ing] a neoliberal 
disappointment in welfare-state objectives of totalizing transformations with an optimistic 
belief in the ability of information and technology to produce a risk-free society” (Amoore 
and De Goede 2005:150). While the disciplinary model targets individuals for reform, 
thereby creating an individuated and normalized society, risk management individuates 
characteristics within individuals, turning people into what Lyon calls “data doubles” and 
what Amoore and De Goede refer to as “a set of measurable risk factors” (Amoore and De 
Goede 2005:150). In risk societies, science only confirms peoples’ feeling that risk is 
everywhere and danger is imminent, while denials of both risk and responsibility for risk 
only exacerbate danger, as when both climate change and responsibility for climate change 
are denied. Founded on an impossibility—the ability to predict the future—risk societies 
are full of ironies like this one.  
The emphasis on prediction in risk society constitutes a break from the type of 
policing that has traditionally taken place in the United States and other democracies: “Big 
data reverses prior policing or intelligence activities…Now bulk data are obtained and data 
are aggregated from different sources before determining the full range of their actual and 
potential uses and mobilizing algorithms and analytics not only to understand a past 
sequence of events but also to predict and intervene before behaviors, events, and 
processes are set in train” (Lyon 2014:4). This shift in criminal justice has major 
implications for individual citizens, particularly when they are unable to contribute to the 
process. (Lyon 2014:4). Predictive policing is also inconsistent, and statistics demonstrate 
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the ineffectiveness of attempting to predict crimes: “Criminological research showing that 
no method of prediction achieved more than a 50 per cent success rate in predicting 
dangerousness” (Zedner 2005:512). Meanwhile, the sacrifice of civil liberties for security 
fundamentally alters the country that is being protected (Beck 2006:330). 
In both risk and control societies, surveillance is a fundamental part of society, a 
necessity for rational government and modern nation states: “Surveillance is a condition of 
modernity, integral to the development of disciplinary power and new forms of 
governance. It has been essential to the development of the nation state, to global 
capitalism and to the decentered forms of disciplinary power and ‘governmentalities’ 
inherent within modern societies” (Bennett 2012:485). Tokens like passwords and pin 
numbers that are used to establish trust and navigate the modern individuated and virtual 
world all create trails and establish searchable databases that enable digital surveillance, 
and the technology that facilitates surveillance is increasingly inescapable (Lyon 2002, 
2004, 2007; Marx and Muschert 2007).  
One potential problem with its ubiquity is the effect that surveillance has on social 
structures. Wacquant addresses this in his discussion of disparate surveillance tactics for 
rich and poor populations. Lyon, too, points to the potential new forms of surveillance have 
for stratifying society. Discussing the increase of state surveillance following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, he states, “The quality of social existence in a globalizing world is affected 
directly by the automated identification and social sorting systems that proliferate both at 
territorial borders and within the routines of everyday life” (Lyon 2002:162). While he 
primarily deals with airport screening measures enacted following 9/11, he also makes it 
clear that the potential for social sorting applies to all forms of modern surveillance 
dependent on automated identification, risk management and categorization: “New 
electronic infrastructures for risk management, deployed in the cause of security, often 
reflect particular priorities and long-term social, economic, and cultural divisions…Within 
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these, categories of suspected terrorist and illegal worker, resident and claimant loom 
large” (Lyon 2002:163). Different social classes are also subjected to different types of 
surveillance, the effects of which are not equally felt. Thin surveillance “monitors 
movement and transactions (e.g., as with cell phones or credit cards) generally without 
constraining mobility, whereas [thick surveillance] refers to confinement delineated and 
frequently fortified spaces” (Marx and Muschert 2007:380). These types of surveillance are 
generally directed at different social groups, exacerbating patterns of inequity: “While poor 
individuals may be in regular contact with the surveillance systems associated with social 
assistance or criminal justice, the middle and upper classes are increasingly subject to their 
own forms of routine observation, documentation and analysis” (Haggerty and Ericson, 
2000:618). Although thin surveillance tends to affect more affluent people with access to 
credit cards and technology, thin surveillance tends to be more superficial and less invasive 
than thick surveillance (Torpey 2007:116).   
Preliminary data also indicates the potential for social stratification as a result of 
modern surveillance. Conducting telephone interviews of 2,400 randomly selected, non-
institutionalized adults, Best and Kreuger studied perceptions of online surveillance and 
the perceived sensitivity of certain search terms mentioning key political figures. While 
they found that a majority of the public felt that they were subject to surveillance. The 
participants also thought that violent as well as merely oppositional political activity 
increased the likelihood of surveillance, political and demographic characteristics were 
predictors for online surveillance perceptions. Individuals with lower income and lower 
education levels were the most likely to perceive monitoring. They suggest that 
perceptions of online surveillance affect online political activity. Therefore, two of the most 
politically underrepresented groups may be most affected by online surveillance (Best and 
Kreuger 2008:205).  
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Data on more traditional forms of surveillance indicates that it has the potential to 
suppress even legal dissent and political activity. Conducting 20 individual and group 
interviews in each of five different geographical regions, Fernandez et al. found that 
surveillance suppressed and modified political dissent, discouraging people from 
participating in even legal protests (Fernandez et al. 2006:11). However, there is 
conflicting evidence about the impact of perceived government surveillance on political 
participation. In an earlier study in which he used, “an ordered probit model of the online 
participation scale using perceived government Internet surveillance and support for the 
war in Iraq and an interaction term of these two variables” (Kreuger 2005:443), Kreuger 
found that people who were strongly opposed to the Iraq War and most confident that the 
government monitors Internet activity were also the most likely to be politically active 
online (Kreuger 2005:446). However, he also cautioned against confusing cause with effect, 
as people predisposed to being more politically active may also be more aware of 
surveillance attempts, stressing that awareness of surveillance is only one in a number of 
predictors of political participation. 
Its other noteworthy traits aside, contemporary surveillance is, first and foremost, 
unprecedented. The events of the early 2000s coincided perfectly to enable modern 
American surveillance: 9/11 happened as technology evolved, and the PATRIOT Act was 
passed to allow the government to capitalize on the ability of new technology to capture 
previously unimagined amounts of data. The several theories that explain contemporary 
surveillance have very little data to support them. Although the discipline of surveillance 
studies is developing rapidly, and the existence of post-9/11 surveillance is often 
discussed, there is still a lack of empirical data. Precisely because of this dearth of concrete 
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information, modern surveillance studies themselves are an example of the risk model. 
There is abundant discussion of risks and what they could mean but scant empirical 
research that actually confirms or disproves this research. In the absence of data, all theory 
is equal, and modern surveillance is yet another incalculable risk. The NSA Program 
therefore provides an opportunity to test theory against reality, and to discard hypothetical 
theorizing in favor of what can more nearly be called facts.  
Questions 
This study addressed the lack of empirical data in surveillance studies. The top-
secret NSA surveillance documents provided an opportunity to compare those documents 
to publicly available government materials, divided into sets of reports, laws and 
guidelines. This study investigated six hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The NSA documents will display different themes than the reports, 
laws, and guidelines. 
Hypothesis 2: The reports and guidelines will be thematically consistent. 
Hypothesis 3: The laws will be thematically consistent with the reports and 
guidelines.  
Hypothesis 4: The control society theoretical model predicts that data collection will 
be haphazard, corporations and competition will play a prominent role in surveillance, 
codes will be used to de-individuate targets of surveillance, and the intent of surveillance is 
to control populations.   
The risk society theoretical model predicts that data collection will be actuarial and 
precise, based on risk models and focused on risk prevention. 
The risk society theoretical model is the best theoretical explanation of post-9/11 




This study used a qualitative research design. Creswell defines qualitative research 
as “an approach for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups 
ascribe to a social or human problem. The process of research involves emerging questions 
and procedures, data typically collected in the participant’s setting, data analysis 
inductively building from particulars to general themes, and the researcher making 
interpretations of the meaning of the data” (Creswell 2014:4). More than quantitative 
research, qualitative research is interested in understanding and interpreting intent and 
meaning (Morgan 2014:49). It often focuses on a specific event, situation, or set of people 
and “relies on a holistic approach that examines as many of the relevant elements as 
possible (Morgan 2014:50). The specific situation studied in this study is the NSA’s 
surveillance program in order to understand the intent and meaning of that program 
within existing surveillance literature.  
Methods  
To qualitatively understand the intent and meaning of the NSA’s surveillance 
program, this study analyzed sets of documents using a comparative content analysis. 
Content analysis developed in the early twentieth century and is used across a range of 
disciplines for systematic analysis of communicative material (Flick et al. 2004:265). While 
this study looked only at texts, content analysis can analyze any documented 
communication. Although content analyses can also be quantitative, qualitative content 
analyses deal with the meaning, rather than simply the technical attributes, of documents. 
Qualitative content analysis involves several steps in which codes are used to establish 
meaning in documents and establish themes: “This sort of qualitative data analysis is a 
series of alternating inductive and deductive steps, whereby data-drive inductive 
hypothesis generation is followed by deductive hypothesis examination, for the purposes of 
verification” (Punch 2009:173) Codes label pieces of data within documents to attach 
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meaning to pieces of data, thereby abstracting the large amounts of data that often 
characterize qualitative studies to sets of themes that can be compared to each other 
(Punch 2009:176). In a content analysis, deductive codes are suggested by the literature 
review, and inductive, or emergent codes, emerge from preliminary analysis of the data 
with the deductive codes. 
To understand which surveillance theory best explains the surveillance exhibited in 
the NSA documents, this study also used a grounded theory analysis: “The ultimate idea in 
discovering a grounded theory is to find a core category, at a high level of abstraction but 
grounded in the data, which accounts for what is central in the data “ (Punch 2009:183). 
Grounded theory analysis was appropriate because, although three existing theoretical 
models were considered, none was rooted in empirical data, and so this study was, in a 
sense, grounding existing theory. To create grounded theory, conceptual categories in the 
data are identified, relationships between these categories are established, and these 
relationships are conceptualized and accounted for at an even higher level of abstraction 
(Punch 2009:183). 
Data  
The data in this study consist of 9 public, official privacy documents (3 laws, 4 reports 
and 2 guidelines) and a convenience sample of 63 NSA documents. The public documents 
were selected to provide an overview of changes in surveillance from the 1974 Privacy Act 
to the 2014 report prepared at the direction of President Obama following the Snowden 
leaks. These documents were specifically referred to in the literature, or referred to by 
other documents already included in the study. The OECD guidelines were included to 
represent international standards for privacy, and the other documents were written for a 
specifically American audience. Due to the volume of the Snowden leaks, those documents 
were selected based on apparent relevance to the research questions as well as their 
representativeness of the larger leak.  
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• The Privacy Act of 1974, Title 5: This act established a code of Fair Information 
Practice that governs federal agencies’ use of and access to personal records (HHS 
2014). Title 5 mandated the creation of the Privacy Commission and contains these 
Fair Information Principles. 
• Privacy Commission Report, 1977: Established in Section 5 of the 1974 Privacy 
Act, the Privacy Commission was created to make recommendations for the 
implementation of the Privacy Act. The report made 162 recommendations, none of 
which were passed by Congress.  
• Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986: Revising federal wiretapping 
and electronic eavesdropping laws, the ECPA expanded protections for citizens’ 
phone conversations. The act also includes the Wiretap Act, the Stored 
Communications Act, and the Pen-Register Act. The Stored Communications Act 
regulates access to stored information sites and is usually applied to electronic 
communications. 
• OECD Privacy Guidelines, 1981: The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) recommended guidelines for member nations to “harmonize” 
privacy legislation (OECD 2013). 
• The PATRIOT Act, 2001: Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the 
Bush Administration introduced the USA PATRIOT Act, which stands for “Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism.” The act has been criticized for its scope and lack of checks 
and balances. Sections 203 and 901 in particular enable mass data mining and 
storage. (ACLU 2011). 
• “Safeguarding Privacy” in the Fight Against Terrorism: Report of the 
Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee. Executive Summary, 2004: This 
is a report on one of NSA’s predecessors, the Terrorist Information Awareness 
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program (TIA) ordered by then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to address 
concerns about legality and privacy protection. 
• NSA documents, 2007-2013: These documents, demonstrating both the existence 
and scope of the National Security Administration’s previously top-secret data 
mining programs, were leaked by whistleblower Edward Snowden in 2013. The 
exact size of the leak is difficult to pinpoint, with the NSA offering estimates that 
range from 200,000 to 1.7 million classified documents (Kelley 2013). This study 
analyzed a convenience sample of 63 internal documents from a range of different 
surveillance programs. 
• Cybersecurity legislative proposal fact sheet, 2009: “The latest achievement in 
the steady stream of progress we are making in securing cyberspace,” this 
legislation was introduced by the Obama administration to protect American cyber-
security (The Whitehouse, 2009). This fact sheet reports the Administration’s 
motives for the proposal, which amend laws related to cybersecurity. 
• Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A framework for protecting 
privacy and promoting innovation in the global digital economy, 2012: This 
consumer privacy Bill of Rights was issued by President Obama. 
• Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values, 2014: Following the 
Snowden leaks in 2013, President Obama ordered a comprehensive review of Big 
Data surveillance and processing, the findings of which this report documents. 
Analysis 
The documents were coded using MAXQDAPlus, professional software for 
qualitative and mixed data analysis. The program helps organize documents and media and 
provides a variety of ways to code documents for key phrases, concepts, and ideas. 
Inductive codes, suggested by the research, included “surveillance,” “legal,” “privacy,” 
“terrorism,” “technology,” “big data,” and “national security.” Deductive codes resulting 
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from document review and preliminary analysis included “protecting our way of life,” 
“accountability,” “transparency,” “oversight,” “challenges,” and “cooperation and 
standardization.” These codes were applied to segments of text that were analyzed for 
meaning and compared to other similarly coded segments.  
The documents were coded in steps. The laws, reports, and guidelines were all 
coded as individual sets, using the deductive codes to build themes. They were then coded 
again with inductive codes, and the preliminary themes—“technology,” “national security,” 
“protecting privacy,” “legal,” and “economic” were compared across these sets of public 
documents. The NSA documents were then coded as their own set, using deductive coding 
and then inductive coding, to identify emergent themes. Finally, the secret NSA documents 
were compared to the public documents to compare themes of the public laws, reports, and 
guidelines to the internal, secret NSA documents. Based on this analysis, four final themes 
emerged: “Technology as Facilitator,” “Protecting America with Big Data,” “The Legality of 
Dataveillance,” and “Protecting Privacy.” These themes were then compared across 
document categories. Validity and reliability was established using a number of safeguards, 
including several rounds of coding by the researcher and external review by scholars 
familiar with surveillance to establish face validity.  
There were several advantages to using MAXQDAPlus for this type of comparative 
content analysis. It allowed the documents to be organized into sets, and its document 
browser made it easy to switch between documents. In addition, it organized the codes 
within a code system. Names of codes and themes could be changed easily, and allowed the 
researcher to see which codes appeared in which documents at a glance. It color-coded 
thematic groups, and highlighted the codes with these same colors within the documents. 
However, while MAXQDA facilitated the analysis, it did not actually perform the analysis. 
 
 Fig 1. MAXQDA window, showing the
highlighted. The top left frame shows
documents. The bottom left frame shows
facilitator,” “protecting america with 
 
Results 
  The analysis demonstrated
guidelines and the NSA document
confluence of technological advances and desire for protection led to the creation of
NSA’s data mining surveillance 
document categories. While the NSA documents demonstrated an interest in legality, they 
also revealed an opaque wing of government not subject to traditional oversights that 
views any collection limitation as a shortcoming to be overcome through the use of
evolving technology. Meanwhile, t
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emphasized the importance of protecting individual data privacy, limiting data collection, 
and preserving government transparency. The reports and guidelines also tempered their 
discussions of technology and data collection with conversations about the importance of 
protecting privacy and constitutional freedoms, presenting data and new technology as 
tools to help the government carry out its job. Those same documents also weighed the 
potential benefits of data collection against the risks they pose to these liberties. National 
security was presented as a motivation for data collection, but it was only one of a number 
of motives, and the reports and guidelines also listed a number of other ways that big data 
could be used to protect the American way of life, discussing ways to protect privacy in the 
face of evolving and escalating technological capabilities. 
The NSA documents also demonstrated a number of motives for data collection, but 
not all of these were consistent with the motivations presented in the reports, laws, and 
guidelines. The NSA documents portrayed use and collection limitations as obstacles to be 
overcome rather than fundamental privacy protections and the invasive nature of the 
surveillance programs was specifically targeted to circumvent user control and overcome 
privacy protections like encryption. While the public documents emphasized the 
importance of transparency, the NSA technicians reported only to superiors within the 
department, there was no evidence of external oversight. Additionally, while terrorists 
were indeed targets of investigation, other countries and NGO’s were also targeted for data 
collection for economic and political reasons. Furthermore, although the reports and 
guidelines advocated removing the legal “line at the border,” which treats foreign nationals 
differently from U.S. citizens, the NSA documents demonstrate their programs’ continued 
use of such distinctions. Finally, contrary to the public documents, discussions in the NSA 
 documents of benefits and challenges related to technology only pertained to collection 
limitations, and not potential infringement of individua
The changes the PATRIOT Act made to the legal system, coupled with technological 
advancement, demonstrably allowed the creation of the NSA surveillance programs, and 
terrorist threats were used as the justification for those changes. Te
expectation, was only mentioned
conspicuous by the frequency with which it was mentioned in those
“Safeguarding Privacy,” and the P
terrorism 237 times in the course of amending privacy and surveillance law, in itself an 
unprecedented justification for changing in legal doctrine. 
analyzed in this study demonstrated that technological advances, coupled 
social situation that allowed unprecedented changes to the legal system, allowed the 
creation of the NSA’s surveillance programs, which operate in a manner inconsistent with 
public portrayals of American government.
Technology as Facilitator
Fig. 2: The theme of technology as a facilitator of mass data mining programs across the document categories 
used in this study.  Discussions of the characteristics of technology were consistently represented across the 
document categories, but discussions of benefits and challenges in the NSA documents were technical in the 
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Discussions of technology were ubiquitous across the document categories, 
emphasizing the unprecedented nature of modern technology, its ubiquity in 
contemporary life, and the rapid pace at which it evolves. Technology was an inductive 
code, but several deductive codes were generated by the data, including those that spoke to 
the characteristics of contemporary technology, like “unprecedented,” “ubiquity,” and 
“escalation.” Discussions of the social effects of technology were also prevalent, and led to 
the creation of the “benefits” and “challenges” codes. The NSA documents contained the 
most technical information, while the other three document categories discussed the 
characteristics of modern technology and the legal, social, and economic impacts of these 
technologies. However, only two reports, “Safeguarding Privacy” in the Digital Age, and the 
Big Data Report, explicitly referenced the properties of technology. The Cybersecurity 
Legislative proposal pertained to issues resulting from new technology, but discussed 
economic and national security issues and took the presence of technology as a fact (The 
White House 2011). The Privacy Protection Study Commission Report, meanwhile, 
predated modern technological issues. The remaining reports, guidelines, and to a much 
lesser extent laws, primarily dealt with the characteristics, uses and challenges of “Big 
Data.” Altogether, discussions of technology throughout the documents led to the creation 
of the first theme, that of Technology as a Facilitator of post-9/11 surveillance.  
While technology facilitated the creation of the controversial NSA surveillance 
programs, appropriate governmental uses of technology were frequently discussed in the 
laws, reports, and guidelines. The Privacy Act stated that, “All agencies should use modern 
technology to inform citizens about what is known and done by their Government,” adding 
that, “Disclosure should be timely.” (Privacy Act 1974:44) The PATRIOT Act also referred to 
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the governments’ use of technology. However, rather than using technology to extend 
privacy and government transparency, the PATRIOT Act described technologies that 
should be created in order to properly execute the law (USAPATRIOT 2001:73). The Big 
Data Report, on the other hand, pointed to many governmental, corporate, and individual 
uses of modern technology. A frequent theme in that document was Obama 
Administration’s use of data. That use is referred to as a “harnessing” of technology. This is 
something the Obama Administration has evidently made a priority: “Since the earliest 
days of President Obama’s first term, this Administration has called on both the public and 
private sector to harness the power of data in ways that boost productivity, improve lives, 
and serve communities.” (Executive Office of the President 2014:9) While the report 
discussed ways in which the administration has used technology to extend transparency, it 
also touched on the potential drawbacks of modern technology, an issue also discussed in 
other reports and guidelines, but entirely neglected in the NSA documents.  
One reason the NSA programs are so unique is that technology itself evolves so 
rapidly and outpaces the legal system’s efforts to check it. The laws, guidelines, and reports 
all stressed the unprecedented qualities of contemporary technology, and the potential 
problems these qualities create; the “unprecedented” code explained changing privacy 
norms, regulations, and shortcomings. The ECPA, Privacy Act, and the PATRIOT Act were 
all prompted at least in part by advances in technology that necessitated updates to 
existing legal frameworks. The OECD guidelines also focused on the use of technology as 
unprecedented: “Over the last three decades, personal data have come to play an 
increasingly important role in our economies, societies and everyday lives. Innovations, 
particularly in information and communication technologies, have impacted business 
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operation, government administration, and the personal activities of individuals” (OECD 
2013:19).  
The reports referred to these same qualities, and the increasing importance of 
technology in contemporary society. The Big Data report repeatedly referred to the 
“transformative” and rapidity of developing technologies while also pointing to the 
ubiquity of new technology and the data it generates: “The information age has 
fundamentally reconfigured how data affects individual lives and the broader economy. 
More than 6,000 data centers dot the globe. International data flows are continuous and 
multidirectional. To a greater degree than ever before, this data is being harnessed by 
businesses, governments, and entrepreneurs to improve the services they deliver and 
enhance how people live and work” (Executive Office of the President 2014:48). In addition 
to the reports and laws, the guidelines also indicated that the nature of new technology is 
unprecedented. The Consumer Privacy guidelines referred to the ways in which modern 
data is easily shared and moved: “Large corporations and government agencies collecting 
information for relatively static databases are no longer typical of personal data collectors 
and processors” (The White House 2012:9).  
 Another characteristic of modern technology exhibited in the reports and guidelines 
was the “rapid action” that it facilitates and, in turn, necessitates. While the speed of 
technology was often presented as an advantage for law enforcement, it also creates 
challenges for the legal system, designed to be slow and deliberative, and creates lags that 
allow programs like the NSA’s. The Big Data report, for example, discussed how this “rapid 
action” helps law enforcement: “[T]he use of advanced surveillance technology by federal, 
state, and local law enforcement can mean a faster and more effective response to criminal 
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activity” (Executive Office of the President 2014:31). Meanwhile, in “Safeguarding Privacy,” 
rapid action was presented as a necessary response to keep pace with the scale and speed 
of modern data mining programs: “We believe rapid action is necessary to address the host 
of government programs that involve data mining concerning U.S. persons and to provide 
clear direction to the people responsible for developing, procuring, implementing, and 
overseeing those programs” (Department of Defense (DOD) 2004:12). Later, the report 
recommended steps to protect individual privacy in the face of rapidly evolving technology, 
and other documents also discussed the need to create alternatives to the legal system to 
protect these individual freedoms. The Consumer Privacy guidelines, for instance, spoke of 
the necessity of rapid action to keep pace with the speed of technology and maintain 
individual privacy protection, advocating “multistakeholder processes” as a more timely 
alternative to regulatory processes and treaty-based organizations: “These groups 
frequently function on the basis of consensus and are amenable to the participation of 
individuals and groups with limited resources. These characteristics lend legitimacy to the 
groups and their findings, which in turn can encourage rapid and effective 
implementation.” While the legal system has been used to regulate privacy, the 
“unprecedented” pace of technological development is presented in these reports and 
guidelines as necessitating supplementary and alternative regulations. However, despite 
presenting issues created by the pace of technology, the shortcomings and relative 
enforceability of the suggested alternatives was not discussed at any length in the 
documents, indicating that these alternatives are in the nascent, hypothetical stages.  
Still, discussions of the lag between the legal system and rapidly advancing 
technology were only one example of the challenges of technology that were discussed in 
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the reports and guidelines. The challenges of mass data mining, almost always with regard 
to upholding privacy laws and standards, were a frequent topic in both the guidelines and 
reports, and the use of the word challenge was consistent across the reports and 
guidelines, framing the more negative aspects of data management as something to be 
overcome rather than immutable drawbacks. The OECD guidelines described challenges 
related to the value of personal data that result from the open and connected environment 
that modern technology allows (OECD 2013:12). The Big Data Report also identified new 
challenges for data privacy protection that result from advancing technology: “The advent 
of more powerful analytics, which can discern quite a bit from even small and disconnected 
pieces of data, raises the possibility that data gathered and held by third parties can be 
amalgamated and analyzed in ways that reveal even more information about individuals” 
(Executive Office of the President 2014:34).  The reports and guidelines explained that the 
rapid development of technology has made previously effective privacy protections 
obsolete. Anonymized data, for example, can now be re-identified with increasing ease. 
Additionally, while sensor technologies that are increasingly prevalent in phones, homes, 
offices, and public utilities automatically collect information, technologies that promote 
transparency and privacy choices are developing more slowly and not being widely utilized 
(Executive Office of the President 2014:42, 58). The report discussed other challenges 
associated with big data, like uneven regulation and access to data by individuals, 
corporations, and the government, and filterable characteristics that create the potential 
for discrimination (Executive Office of the President 2014:48). The “challenges” of Big Data 
represented in the NSA documents, however, only reflected areas of limited access (NSA 
27), and social challenges like discrimination were not discussed at all. Other challenges 
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were issued internally to increase technical and technological data mining capabilities 
(NSA 32). Solutions for overcoming these challenges were usually based in technological 
developments (NSA 30).  
Similarly, the NSA documents discussed the benefits of technology in a manner that 
was inconsistent with its portrayal in the reports and guidelines. Although in the public 
documents the challenges of Big Data were primarily addressed in the Big Data Report, the 
OECD Guidelines and the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, the “benefits” of Big Data were 
extolled at length in those same documents, and also “Safeguarding Privacy.” One listed 
benefit of Big Data was its potential to actually protect privacy; while the Big Data report 
presented the re-identification of data as a challenge, it also stated that big data can be used 
to “enhance accountability and to engineer systems that are inherently more respectful of 
privacy and civil rights” (Executive Office of the President 2014:22). The Big Data report 
also presented multiple other social and economic benefits of using data to increase 
productivity: “Big data applications create social and economic value on a scale that, 
collectively, is of strategic importance for the nation. Technological innovation is the 
animating force of the American economy. In the years to come, big data will foster 
significant productivity gains in industry and manufacturing, further accelerating the 
integration of the industrial and information economies” (Executive Office of the President 
2014:48). While the reports and guidelines discussed the social benefits of technology, the 
NSA documents treated the benefits of technology the same way they discussed challenges; 
while collection limitation was presented as a challenge of technology, collection 
facilitation was a benefit, and social repercussions were not discussed.  
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There were further disparities in the discussions of technology in the NSA 
documents versus those in the reports, laws, and guidelines. The NSA documents were 
overwhelmingly technical, and a majority of them referenced technology. As discussed, the 
presentation of potential social benefits and challenges of these technologies was entirely 
absent, and technological advances were instead only celebrated for their unprecedented 
ability to increase access to targets’ data (NSA 10, NSA 29) and their efficiency (NSA 30), 
but other aspects of technology were also discussed. For example, the increasing 
capabilities of evolving technology were also frequently discussed (NSA 36, NSA 29, NSA 
30), as were the perceived threat of foreign nations’ increasing technological capabilities 
(NSA 31). In addition, the training-based nature of many of the documents spoke to the 
novelty of the access provided by technology, and the escalating ubiquity of data collection 
was reflected through slides that demonstrated drastically escalating data collection (NSA 
19, NSA 22, NSA, NSA 30, NSA 30, NSA 34, NSA 43). Technological discussions in the NSA 
documents also included the vulnerabilities of particular types of technology, websites, and 
email providers (NSA 32, NSA, NSA 10, NSA 11, NSA 16A, NSA 16D), further suggesting that 
the intent of the program was to maximize the potential of technology, not consider its 
social repercussions. As in the reports and guidelines, more rapid action was presented as 
one of the benefits of technological advances (NSA 15, NSA 7, NSA 30 2), but, partly owing 
to their technical nature, the NSA documents were much less reflexive than the public 
documents, and, while they demonstrated the properties of technology that were discussed 
in the reports and guidelines, there was no debate about the merits of the conducted 
surveillance. Still, the NSA documents corroborate the theme of technology as facilitator, 
 providing evidence that the qualities of technology discussed in the reports, laws, and 
guidelines facilitated the creation and expansio
 Protecting America with Big Data
Fig. 3: The theme of Protecting America with Big Data included references to national
prevention as well as discussions of the importance of protecting American ideals and freedoms. These 
discussions were principally limited to the reports and guidelines. The invocation of terrorists and terrorism 
as justifications for data collection was similarly limited, app
“Safeguarding Privacy,” and virtually nowhere else in the reports, laws, and guidelines.
 
The second theme, “Protecting America with Big Data,” encompassed recurring 
representations of the national governmen
made the NSA programs technically feasible, the documents demonstrated that a desire 
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terrorism play in dataveillance, but also the 
and threatens fundamental American rights and freedoms. 
as a way of protecting American citizens across the laws, reports, guidelines, and N
documents. While “terrorism,” “national security,” and “crime prevention” were
codes, “protecting our way of life” emerged as a deductive code as a result of the emphasis 
that the reports and guidelines placed on the importance of protecting American liberties 
and freedoms.  
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As expected, national security was presented as an important user and driver of 
dataveillance in the reports, laws, guidelines, and NSA documents. Both “Safeguarding 
Privacy” and the Big Data report addressed this benefit, and the Cybersecurity Legislative 
Proposal recommended updating cybersecurity law “to better protect America against 
cyber threats (The White House 2011:1). “Safeguarding Privacy”, which was created 
specifically to evaluate government data mining programs, dealt almost exclusively with 
this benefit to national security (DOD 2004). The PATRIOT Act, meanwhile, specifically 
amended surveillance law in order to protect against terrorist threats, and the NSA 
documents indicated targeting potential terrorists in order to prevent future attacks. The 
invocation of terrorists and terrorism across the documents was itself noteworthy. The 
documents that predated the 2001 terrorist attacks were, except where amended, wholly 
silent on the subject, but the PATRIOT Act, used the words terrorist and terrorism 237 
times, or an average of 1.8 times per page (USAPATRIOT 2001). “Safeguarding Privacy” 
repeated the words 26 times over 18 pages, an average of 1.4 times per page (DOD 2004). 
By contrast, the Big Data report used the word terrorist only once in 85 pages, and none of 
the other reports, laws, or guidelines mentioned either terrorists or terrorism. While 
national security continued to be a relevant justification for data collection across the 
reports, guidelines, and laws, terrorism itself was used as a justification only in the two 
documents that were written closest to the 9/11 attacks, indicating that it lost its salience 
as the attacks became less immediate.  
 However, national security was not the only way government was portrayed as a 
protector in the documents. The code “protecting our way of life” was an inductive code, 
created for discussions in the reports, laws, and guidelines about protecting privacy rights 
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and constitutional freedoms. The theme of government as protector, both of its citizens and 
freedom, appeared across all four document groups, with the reports and guidelines 
speaking most frequently of the obligation the government has to “protect its citizens when 
exercising power and authority for the public good” (Executive Office of the President 
2014:22). In reports that discussed the dangers posed to privacy by Big Data, “protecting 
our way of life” asserted the government’s commitment to upholding law and privacy, even 
as, “big data could be a tool that substantially expands government power over citizens” 
(Executive Office of the President 2014:22). As expressed in the Consumer Privacy Bill of 
Rights, this government commitment to “protecting our way of life” extended to the private 
sector; the report stated that the “United States has both the responsibility and incentive to 
help establish forward-looking privacy policy models that foster innovation and preserve 
basic privacy rights” (The White House 2012:7). That paper suggested the access and 
accuracy principle to facilitate consumer access to data that is collected about them, 
“interpreted with full respect for First Amendment values, especially for non-commercial 
speakers and individuals exercising freedom of the press” (The White House 2012:20). In 
addition, while “Safeguarding Privacy” dedicated much discussion to terrorist threats and 
the pressing need to defend against these threats, it also stated that Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld, “charged the committee with developing safeguards to ensure that the 
application of this or any like technology developed within the DOD is carried out in 
accordance with U.S. law and American values related to privacy” (DOD 2004:1). 
“Protecting our way of life,” therefore, emphasized the government’s purported 
commitment to protecting its citizens from external, as well as internal threats.  
 The NSA documents did not display the same commitment to protecting individual 
 35
liberties that was evident in the reports, laws, and guidelines, and only demonstrated an 
interest in national security. The NSA documents contained several references to 
protecting national security and promoting law enforcement efforts, and some of these 
explicitly referred to protecting America’s cyberspace through data mining initiatives (NSA 
38 2, 4). Other references were to counterterrorism, preventing and investigating 
international crime and narcotics, and other international security issues (NSA 22). Two 
documents explicitly referred to threat management as a goal (NSA 10, NSA 30 7), and the 
DTI Report in particular contained references to terrorism and preventing terrorist threats 
(NSA 30). Targets of surveillance included but were not limited to suspected terrorists; 
other targets included foreign governments (NSA 10). Furthermore, while discussions of 
national security in the NSA documents omitted discussions of “protecting our way of life,” 
national security was not the only justification used for surveillance, and other cases of 
surveillance were economically and politically motivated (NSA 24). Although the NSA 
documents emphasized national security over the protection of civil liberties, and were in 
that sense inconsistent with the laws, reports, and guidelines, they did corroborate the 
overall theme of protection being both a justification for and a use of dataveillance. 
Furthermore, the overwhelming use of the word terrorist and terrorism as justifications for 
changes in surveillance law following the 9/11 attacks indicates a shift in the social climate 
and escalation of fears following those attacks, leading to a social environment that was 




 The Legality of Dataveillance
Fig. 4: The Legality of Dataveillance. The legal system, slow and deliberate by design, was portrayed in the 
reports and guidelines as too slow to keep up with the pace of technological change, creating legal loopholes
that allow mass data collection programs
to a legal “line at the border” that treats foreign
was codified in the PATRIOT Act but discredited in the reports and guidelines, which advocated extending 
privacy protections to everyone.  
 
While the PATRIOT Act used the instability and fear sur
attacks to justify changing the surveillance requirements for suspected terrorists, the other 
documents used in this study discussed additional legal issues, related to technological 
advances, that potentially threaten privacy. 
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PATRIOT Act actually codified an example of this: a legal line at the border that excludes
foreign nationals from the privacy protection afforded to American citizens
2001:11, 15). Traditionally, information collected outside of the United States 
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technological advances, data no longer stops at political borders, and a substantial amount 
of collected information flows through American as well as foreign data networks (NSA 4, 
NSA 5, NSA 7). Indeed, the NSA documents present this as a benefit to be used when data 
gathering (NSA 4). The major distinction governing surveillance now is not where the 
information is collected, but on whom it is collected. Importantly, the reports and 
guidelines used in this study discredited this approach, and advocated extending American 
privacy protections to all individuals, but the suggestions made in those documents have 
not been followed. This raises questions about the best way to protect privacy given 
rapidly advancing technological capabilities, a slow legal system, and unenforceable 
suggestions made in official reports and guidelines.  
Perhaps because of the confusion surrounding the issue, the “Legality of 
Dataveillance” theme was the least consistent of the four that emerged from this study. 
Within the laws, the PATRIOT Act was discordant with the ECPA and the Privacy Act. Those 
earlier documents both extended individual rights to data protection and government 
transparency where the PATRIOT Act limited them. Sometimes, as when the Big Data 
report called the existing consumer data privacy framework “strong” in its introduction 
(The White House 2012:i) but then detailed limitations of the existing legal system in the 
body (The White House 2012:6), documents even contradicted themselves.  
Of all the document categories, the reports and guidelines presented the most 
concerns about individual legal privacy protections. In the reports and guidelines, privacy 
was presented as a fundamental and cherished, as well as constitutionally protected, 
American right. The reports and guidelines, while stressing the government’s commitment 
to maintaining these rights even as Big Data fundamentally changes the way government 
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functions, also discussed the importance of creating trust with the American public. The 
reports and guidelines enumerated a number of specific threats Big Data presents for 
privacy: “Big data analytics have the potential to eclipse longstanding civil rights 
protections in how personal information is used in housing, credit, employment, health, 
education, and the marketplace” (Executive Office of the President 2014:iiv). The Big Data 
report frequently discussed the potential for discrimination; 9 of the 10 coded segments in 
this category came from that report. The other came from the OECD guidelines, which 
made ensuring there is no discrimination against data subjects one of its provisions under 
“National Implementation” (OECD 2013:17). Because digitized data is easily searchable and 
filterable—something that makes it particularly useful for marketers as well as 
surveillance technicians—it presents the possibility of what the Big Data report called 
“digital redlining.” That report listed instances of different prices offered to individuals 
based on the area in which they live. In its recommendations, it exhorted companies and 
the government to take policy measures necessary to prevent these instances of 
discrimination. These privacy issues were presented as an inherent “challenge” resulting 
from big data, and the government was presented as both respectful of privacy and 
committed to upholding the law. 
The legal limitations code was used in the Big Data Report, the OECD guidelines, the 
Consumer Privacy, and “Safeguarding Privacy” guidelines. While the laws all dealt with 
privacy issues—The ECPA and the Privacy Act were both created to address threats to 
privacy arising from new technology and governmental collection and storage of data on 
individuals and the PATRIOT Act maintained concern with constitutionally protected rights 
of citizens even as it extended governmental data collection powers—the laws themselves 
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did not explicitly address the legal limitations that led to their creation. The reports and 
guidelines, however, generally presented legal limitations as a significant obstacle to 
protecting privacy. Legal privacy protections were called disjointed, out of date, and too 
narrowly defined (Executive Office of the President 2014; DOD 2004). “Safeguarding 
Privacy” presented an alternate view of legal limitations, discussing them in reference to 
the fight against terrorism: “Existing legal requirements applicable to the government’s 
many data mining programs are numerous, but disjointed and often outdated, and as a 
result may compromise the protection of privacy, public confidence, and the nation’s ability 
to craft effective and lawful responses to terrorism” (DOD 2004:5).  
The Big Data Report and the Consumer Privacy Guidelines both framed their 
discussion of legal limitations with regard to individual privacy protections. The Big Data 
Report discussed how privacy law became disjointed and narrowly defined, making it more 
difficult to broadly protect individual privacy: “In the United States during the 1970s and 
80s, narrowly defined sectoral privacy laws began to supplement the tort-based body of 
common law. These sector-specific laws create privacy safeguards that apply only to 
specific types of entities and data. With a few exceptions, individual states and the federal 
government have predominantly enacted privacy laws on a sectoral basis” (Executive 
Office of the President 2014:18). In addition, The Consumer Privacy bill also cited the legal 
limitations of Internet consumer privacy protection, including the lack of comprehensive 
policy:  
“Much of the personal data used on the Internet, however, is not 
subject to comprehensive Federal statutory protection, because most Federal 
data privacy statutes apply only to specific sectors, such as healthcare, 
education, communications, and financial services or, in the case of online 
data collection, to children” (The White House 2012:6).  
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In the foreword to The Consumer Privacy bill, the authors contradicted this statement, 
saying, “The consumer data privacy framework in the United States is, in fact, strong. This 
framework rests on fundamental privacy values, flexible and adaptable common law 
protections and consumer protection statutes, Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
enforcement, and policy development that involves a broad array of stakeholders”(The 
White House 2012:i) While the authors tempered this optimistic statement somewhat, the 
endorsement of existing consumer data privacy protection contradicted statements 
contained within those guidelines and the other documents used in this study. 
 The Big Data report in particular established the history of privacy law in the United 
States. Fair information practice principles, or FIPPs, were created in 1973 and established 
in the 1974 Privacy Act and today, “form the bedrock of modern data protection regimes.” 
(Executive Office of the President 2014:17) “The FIPPs articulate basic protections for 
handling personal data. They provide that an individual has a right to know what data are  
collected about him or her and how it is used. The individual should further have a right to 
object to some uses and to correct inaccurate information. The organization that collects 
information has an obligation to ensure that the data are reliable and kept secure.” 
(Executive Office of the President 2014:17) Still, as with the rest of the existing legal 
privacy protections, the NSA documents demonstrate practical concerns with existing legal 
privacy protections. 
 While the NSA documents did demonstrate an interest in legality, they also showed 
some current limitations of legal oversight. They also show that data are collected on U.S. 
citizens as well as foreign nationals, referring to efforts to minimize, or remove personally 
identifiable information from, data collected on U.S. citizens (NSA 27; 37). The Big Data 
 Report argued that minimization is increasingly ineffecti
the use of the technique shows
citizens as well as foreign nationals.
demonstrated inconsistencies between public statements and private practices, and 
illuminated the limitations of current privacy protections.
 Protecting Privacy: Accountability, Transparency, and Oversight
Fig. 5: Protecting Privacy in the Face of Legal, Social, and Technological Change. The reports and guidelines 
both discussed measures to protect privacy, but these 
demonstrated in the NSA documents. While the reports and guidelines both stressed the importance of 
transparency and external oversight for maintaining a robust democracy, the NSA documents only 
demonstrated internal oversight. Additionally, while co
reports and guidelines as a way for protecting data, in the NSA documents, co
were used to share data collected under FISA court warrants wi
are not supposed to operate under the FISA court.
  
 Because of the legal system
suggested or, in the case of the laws,
“Protecting Privacy” encompassed these discussions and revealed incompatibilities 
between the suggestions made in the reports and guidelines and standard NSA practices. 
The reports and guidelines were 
facilitated by transparency and oversight as a way to protect privacy. 
also discussed the need for more extensive user controls that would allow users t
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how much information was collected about them (Executive Office of the President 
2014:62). The Consumer Privacy and OECD guidelines similarly advocated for use and 
collection limitations that would restrict the amount of data that are collected and also the 
ways companies use those data (OECD 2013:14; The White House 2012:1, 6, 15, 16, 21). 
User control and collection limitation help individuals manage the data that is collected 
about them on the front end, while use limitations protect their data once it has already 
been collected. Accountability, transparency, and oversight theoretically apply to all stages 
of the process, but the NSA documents indicate differing standards of accountability and 
transparency than were evident in the reports and guidelines.  
 The accountability code appeared in the guidelines, the PATRIOT Act, and the Privacy 
Act. In his introduction to the Privacy Act, President Obama stated that, “A democracy 
requires accountability, and accountability requires transparency” (Privacy Act 1974:44). 
That act also affirmed the need to have transparency in order to have government 
accountability, establishing the right of citizens to their own information or information 
about their government. The PATRIOT Act, however, removed accountability for people 
who “in good faith produce tangible things under and order pursuant to section [215…] 
Such production shall not be deemed to constitute a waiver of any privilege in any other 
proceeding or context” (USAPATRIOT 2001:17). Not only are people not required to 
divulge their involvement and disclosure of information pursuant to a FISA warrant, they 
are also outright prohibited from discussing those warrants with anyone, including legal 
counsel. That inhibits the possibility for journalists and advocates to investigate or 
question the program, thereby allowing the programs to operate in secret without external 
review. The PATRIOT Act did establish some accountability for law enforcement 
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implementing an ex parte order, requiring records of all installed surveillance devices that 
identify the officers that installed and/or accessed the device, the dates and times of 
installation, uninstallation, and access, the configuration of the device, and information 
collected by the device (USAPATRIOT 2001:17), but overall it still limited government 
accountability where earlier laws enhanced it.  
 The guidelines discussed accountability differently than the laws. The Consumer 
Privacy discussed the need for FTC enforcement that holds companies accountable for 
protecting sensitive personal information (The White House 2012:2, 29). However, those 
guidelines also stated that companies and consumers share responsibility for protecting 
their information. While “Consumers have a right to have personal data handled by 
companies with appropriate measures in place to assure they adhere to the Consumer 
Privacy Bill of Rights” (The White House 2012:1), consumers also have a responsibility 
when choosing privacy settings and sharing personal data (The White House 2012:13). The 
OECD guidelines, however, stressed that data controllers alone are accountable for 
personal data under their control and never mentioned the responsibility consumers or 
individuals bear for managing their own data (OECD 2013:16). 
 While accountability was portrayed as an important way to protect privacy, 
“transparency,” according to the documents that discussed it, is the principle way of 
ensuring accountability. The Big Data report and Consumer Privacy guidelines generally 
applauded the way the U.S. government deals with privacy issues, giving the Obama 
administration in particular credit for transparency (Executive Office of the President 
2014:9). The Big Data Report, which presented transparency as essential for democracy, 
gave multiple examples of the government’s commitment to transparency, including its 
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establishment of data.gov, a central site for all publicly accessible government data. While it 
is the only document in this study published following the Snowden revelations, there was 
no discussion of the ramifications of top-secret, ongoing surveillance programs for 
transparency. 
 The OECD Guidelines and Consumer Privacy guidelines also both emphasized the 
need for transparency when using data. The four coded segments from the OECD guidelines 
all spoke of member countries’ obligation to uphold principles of transparency. The 
openness principle (OECD 2013:15) in that set of guidelines was similar to the Fair 
Information Practices enumerated in the Privacy Act. That document established principles 
of access to personal information held by the government: “Each agency that maintains a 
system of records shall—(1) upon request by any individual to gain access to his record or 
to any information pertaining to him which is contained in the system, permit him and 
upon his request, a person of his own choosing to accompany him, to review the record and 
have a copy made of all or any portion thereof in a form comprehensible to him” (Privacy 
Act 1974:47). 
 In his note at the beginning of the privacy act, President Obama asserted his 
commitment to transparency, and upholding the Privacy Act in order to perpetuate the 
vital role it plays in democracy (Privacy Act 1974:44). He exhorted government agencies 
and employees to respect the Freedom of Information Act: 
The Freedom of Information Act should be administered with a clear 
presumption: In the face of doubt, openness prevails. The Government 
should not keep information confidential merely because public officials 
might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be 
revealed, or because of speculative or abstract fears. Nondisclosure should 
never be based on an effort to protect the personal interests of Government 
officials at the expense of those they are supposed to serve. In responding to 
requests under the FOIA, executive branch agencies should act promptly and 
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in a spirit of cooperation, recognizing that such agencies are servants of the 
public (Privacy Act 1974:44). 
 
 The 13 segments from the Consumer Privacy report that were coded for “protecting 
privacy” spoke of consumer rights to easily accessible and understandable information 
about how their personal data is collected and used, as well as the ability to correct 
inaccurate data (The White House 2013:13, 48). One segment discussed the need for more 
transparency in credit markets (The White House 2012:47). Two codes discussed the 
Obama administration’s commitment to government transparency (The White House 
2012:2, 20). Like “transparency,” “oversight” was portrayed in the documents as a way of 
ensuring accountability. This code appeared most often in the reports and guidelines, but 
the laws discussed oversight, as well. Section 502 of the PATRIOT Act stated, “On a 
semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall fully inform the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
the Senate concerning all requests for the production of tangible things under section 402” 
(USAPATRIOT 2001:17). “Safeguarding Privacy” also gave the responsibility for oversight 
of data mining programs to Congress: “There is also a critical need for Congress to exercise 
appropriate oversight, especially given the fact that many data mining programs may 
involve classified information which would prevent immediate public disclosure” (DOD 
2004:10). The report also recommended managerial and judicial oversight, including a 5-
part checklist for ensuring oversight of data mining and recommending that the Secretary 
create “meaningful” oversight mechanisms (DOD 2004:5, 8). 
 The OECD guidelines discussed the need for oversight 8 times, and the Consumer 
Privacy guidelines implicitly referred to the need for oversight when discussing 
 46
accountability and enforcement, in statements that call for FTC enforcement, and 
government accountability. The Big Data report referred to a lack of oversight for 
government employees who deal with data: “In the past, users and system administrators 
might have been issued a login and username and granted total access, sometimes without 
an audit trail monitoring their use” (Executive Office of the President 2014:28). Later, that 
same report stressed the need for various arenas of government to experiment with the 
potential of Big Data, but only while being subjected to appropriate accountability and 
oversight measures (Executive Office of the President 2014:66). The cybersecurity 
legislative proposal also recommended oversight that includes congressional reporting 
(DOD 2004:2, 4). 
 The NSA documents discussed privacy in the context of steps taken to protect and 
properly handle sensitive data (NSA 30 12). The DTI report, for example, referenced the 
creation of 430,000 terrorism-related records, and deletion of “50,000 subjects whose 
nexus to terrorism was refuted, or did not meet current watchlisting criteria” (NSA 30 2). 
Another presentation stated that each agency will “minimize the acquisition and retention, 
and prohibit the dissemination, of non-publicly available information concerning 
unconsenting U.S. persons consistent with the need of the U.S. to obtain, produce, and 
disseminate foreign intelligence information” (NSA 43). Not only are data on U.S. citizens 
clearly being acquired, there is no cross-agency standardized protocol for disposing of such 
information. The AuroraGold project apparently includes “auto-minimization” (NSA 27 2). 
 No segments of the NSA documents met the criteria for the “accountability” code, but 
there were several references to oversight. In the documents, this oversight was entirely 
internal, team-based or FISA court-based (NSA 2C, NSA 21). Sometimes, specific analysts or 
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people with specific levels of clearance were the only people allowed to conduct certain 
surveillance, but it was unclear who except their superiors within the agency has oversight 
over these individuals (NSA 14, NSA 15). Reference was made to NSA standards (NSA 27 2) 
and observance of rules and indications of authorities requesting investigations (NSA 39 
49). User monitoring, or internal audits of IC-wide users were conducted by the NSA “to 
guarantee correct investigations and the observance of rules and indications” (NSA 39). 
The respective agencies would be notified of non-compliance, and persons found to be 
conducting inappropriate surveillance would be removed (NSA 43), but there was no 
reference to external or Congressional oversight. There was also minimal evidence of 
collection limitation in the NSA documents, aside from references to minimization of data 
collected on U.S. citizens. Most of the documents referencing collection celebrated 
escalating collection capabilities and quantities of information (NSA 30 5, 6, 8, 10, 12; NSA 
32 2; NSA 34 11; NSA 43; NSA 43 16, 20, 30; NSA 44 1). 
 In addition to accountability, transparency, and oversight, the reports and guidelines 
also presented cooperation and standardization as a method of protecting privacy. The 
code “standardization and cooperation” was used across all four document categories, but 
had an entirely different meaning in the NSA documents than in the reports, guidelines and, 
to a lesser extent, the laws. The reports and guidelines presented standardization and 
cooperation as a necessary measure that, like transparency, accountability, and oversight, 
is necessary to protect individual data. For example, The Big Data report explicitly dealt 
with a lack of cooperation and inter-departmental standardization that poses challenges 
for data and privacy protection: “Many of the databases DHS operates today are physically 
disconnected, run legacy operating systems, and are unable to integrate information across 
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different security classifications. The Department also carries out a diverse portfolio of 
missions, each governed by separate authorities in law...Ensuring information is properly 
used falls to six offices at DHS headquarters” (Executive Office of the President 2014:27). 
Likewise, “Safeguarding Privacy”, the Privacy Protection Study Commission Report, the Big 
Data Report, the OECD guidelines, and the Consumer Privacy guidelines all recommended 
improving standardization and cooperation with respect to data privacy protections (DOD 
2004:9, 10; The White House 2011:1; Executive Office of the President 2014:37, 48; OECD 
11, 16, 17; The White House 2012:2, 7). Inter and intra-governmental cooperation was one 
recurring theme. “Safeguarding Privacy” stated that, “government efforts to protect 
national security and fight crime and to protect privacy will be enhanced by the articulation 
of government-wide principles and a consistent system of laws and processes” (DOD 
2004:10). The Big Data report likewise suggested adopting its recommendations “across all 
agencies and security levels” (Executive Office of the President 2014:37). That report also 
encouraged cooperation between public and private sectors (Executive Office of the 
President 2014:48), as do the OECD guidelines, which also advocated inter-government 
cooperation: “The continuous flows of personal data across global networks amplify the 
need for improved interoperability among privacy frameworks as well as strengthened 
cross-border cooperation among privacy enforcement authorities” (OECD 2013:11). The 
Consumer Privacy guidelines likewise encouraged global cooperation, specifically 
international operability of data privacy frameworks through mutual recognition and 
enforcement cooperation. (The White House 2012:2, 7). 
 The PATRIOT Act also explicitly encouraged cooperation, although its intent was less 
clear in that document. The results of the PATRIOT Act’s references to cooperation are 
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demonstrated in the NSA documents. Orders issued under Section 216 automatically 
applied “to any person or entity providing wire or electronic communication service in the 
United States whose assistance may facilitate the execution of the order” (PATRIOT 18). 
Under Section 414, the Act mandates that visa entry and exit data systems interface with 
law enforcement databases (USAPATRIOT 2001:83). The NSA documents demonstrated 
this cooperation with other government agencies, including the CIA, FBI, TSC, TSA, NGA, 
DoS, DHS, CPB, DIA, DEA, US Army Special Forces, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 
INTERPOL, and GCHQ (NSA 30 9, NSA 34 6, NSA 37 1). There were references to 
information sharing with the CIA and FBI, and to training agents from the other 
departments (NSA 30 8). The Directorate of Terrorist Identities (DTI) partnered with the 
CIA to use information obtained on foreign governments through that agency’s HYDRA 
program, which clandestinely accessed foreign government’s databases and mined the data 
found there. (NSA 30 9). In the instance discussed, DTI provided the names of 555 Pakistani 
subjects. The HYDRA program in turn vetted these names against Pakistani passports, 
enhancing the information on all 555 of those subjects (NSA 30 9).  
 The NSA documents demonstrate cooperation in other ways. While in most cases, the 
cooperation can be seen as resulting directly from the PATRIOT Act, this cooperation did 
not function as a privacy protection. Cooperation with private businesses demonstrated in 
the NSA documents included the NSA’s use of data collected by gmail, facebook, Hotmail, 
Yahoo, Apple, Google, Skype, paltalk.com, YouTube and AolMail from their customers under 
their terms of use. Rather than serving to protect individual or consumer privacy, as the 
reports and guidelines indicated, the NSA’s cooperation with private corporations actually 
violated these individual privacies. As dictated by section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, the 
 50
corporations turned over the information but did not disclose to anyone, including the 
surveillance subjects, that they had done so. One slide referenced the two types of 
collection the program uses: upstream, which collects communications on “fiber cables and 
infrastructure as data flows past” (NSA 3). The other collection took data directly from the 
servers of the aforementioned companies, calling into question how voluntary corporate 
cooperation with the NSA actually is. 
 Indeed, the NSA’s cooperation appears to be limited and coercive. Aside from working 
with the four other countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK) in the Five Eyes, 
there was no evidence in the NSA documents of cooperation with other countries. Rather, 
the governments of literally every other country not in the Five Eyes were authorized as 
surveillance targets, along with “Entities openly acknowledged by a Foreign Government or 
Governments to be Directed and Controlled by Such Foreign Government or Governments” 
(NSA 1). This list included the United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union, the 
African Union, and OPEC (NSA 1). The secretive nature of warrants provides no recourse 
for appeal and, as a whole, the NSA programs make a mockery of the standardization and 
cooperation exalted in the reports and guidelines as a valuable method for protecting 
privacy. 
 The themes that emerged throughout the analysis of the data in this study, when 
compared together, paint a picture of post-9/11 dataveillance. Technological innovations 
made this type of surveillance possible, but the social insecurity and desire for protection 
in an uncertain world that followed the 9/11 terrorist attacks allowed a fundamental 
change in the existing legal framework. The PATRIOT Act, which codified those changes, 
was inconsistent with the previous laws analyzed in this study because it limited civil 
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liberties and extended governmental surveillance powers where the earlier laws extended 
privacy protections and standards of government transparency and accountability. 
Additionally, the PATRIOT Act relied heavily on the invocation of terrorist threats to justify 
the changes it made; the earlier laws never reference these threats at all. 
 The reports and guidelines were most thematically similar of all the document 
groups, consistently portraying technology as a facilitator of data mining programs. The 
social risks and benefits of these technologies were thoughtfully considered in both the 
reports and guidelines; neither the laws nor the NSA documents considered these potential 
ramifications. Privacy was also presented as a fundamental and constitutionally protected 
American right in the reports and guidelines. While the laws did not discuss privacy in the 
same way as the reports and guidelines, the ECPA and the Privacy Act both extended 
individual privacy protections, and therefore were thematically similar to the reports and 
guidelines in that respect. The PATRIOT Act continued to be distinct from the other laws, 
but it too contained provisions designed to protect privacy. Meanwhile, the NSA documents 
were again inconsistent, adhering to legal standards but employing methods of privacy 
protection that the reports and guidelines discredited. The NSA documents also contained 
no references to the ideological importance of protecting privacy. Furthermore, while the 
reports and guidelines presented external oversight and transparency as essential for 
democratic government, and standardization and cooperation as a valuable tool for 
protecting data, the NSA documents demonstrated only internal oversight, no 





Hypothesis 1: The NSA documents will display different themes than the reports, 
laws, and guidelines. 
Finding: The NSA documents displayed similar themes as the other document 
categories, but their meaning often contradicted their usage in the reports, laws and 
guidelines. The risk society model predicts that attempts to predict risk in contemporary 
society results in contradictions, but the control society model would portray this 
contradiction as a deliberate attempt to mislead the public.  
Hypothesis 2: The reports and guidelines will be thematically consistent. 
Finding: Of all the document categories, the reports and guidelines were the most 
thematically consistent. 
Hypothesis 3: The laws will be thematically consistent with the reports and 
guidelines.  
Finding: The laws were not thematically consistent with each other, and the 
PATRIOT Act curtailed civil liberties where the ECPA and the Privacy Act protected them. 
The laws were more similar to the reports and guidelines than the NSA documents, but 
were a distinctive category.  
Hypothesis 4: The control society theoretical model predicts that data collection 
will be haphazard, corporations and competition will play a prominent role in surveillance, 
codes will be used to de-individuate targets of surveillance, and the intent of surveillance is 
to control populations.   
The risk society theoretical model predicts that data collection will be actuarial and 
precise, based on risk models and focused on risk prevention. 
The risk society theoretical model is the best theoretical explanation of post-9/11 
surveillance, as represented by the NSA’s surveillance program. 
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Finding: The NSA surveillance programs collected data haphazardly and 
corporations played a prominent role in surveillance. Codes were used to de-individuate 
targets of surveillance, but the question of intent is subjective. Given the scope of the 
surveillance programs’ data collection, the collected information cannot currently be 
analyzed effectively. Contradictions are inherent in the program, and its existence is 
justified by the presence of terrorist threat. Both the risk society and control society 
models are applicable to the NSA’s surveillance programs.  
The results illuminate a discrepancy between public and private governmental 
representations of privacy and transparency that is best explained by the risk management 
theoretical model. Although the public documents were fairly consistent across the laws, 
reports, and guidelines, with the guidelines and reports almost thematically 
indistinguishable, the NSA documents employed different language and thematic 
representations. For example, standardization and cooperation was presented in the 
reports and guidelines as a tool for enhancing privacy protections, but in the NSA 
documents was a way of collecting even more data, often without the consent of the 
“cooperating” parties. Similarly, collection limitation was presented in the reports and 
guidelines as a way of limiting outside intrusion into consumers’ records, but in the NSA 
documents was portrayed as a limitation to be overcome. NSA’s surveillance programs are 
justified by previous threats but focused on the prevention of further crimes. Furthermore, 
the volume of information indicates a lack of both control and oversight in the face of 
unknowable dangers. The risk management theoretical model therefore best explained the 
thematic differences in the public documents versus the NSA documents, but the control 
society model also appeared to have some applicability. 
 54
While similar themes were present across all of the document groups, the portrayal 
of these themes was most consistent across the reports and guidelines. Themes in the 
reports and guidelines also tended to be consistent with those in the laws, which formed a 
more distinct category because of their formal, legal construction. However, the majority of 
themes in the NSA documents were inconsistent with the other document categories. This 
was only partially explained by their technical nature, and indicated deliberate framing in 
the public documents to convey a message more harmonious with American ideals of 
privacy and freedom. One reason the NSA documents were so distinct is that they, like the 
laws, were written differently from the reports and guidelines. They were by far the most 
technical documents; the NSA is fundamentally a bureaucratic organization, and the 
majority of the NSA documents were intended for technicians, to serve as progress reports 
and provide training. Unlike the public documents, the NSA documents were also obviously 
not intended for an external audience. Thoughtful treatment of American ideals had no 
place in the NSA documents; the intended audience was presumably already convinced of 
the merits of the program. Still, practical explanations for the dissimilarity of the NSA 
documents to the rest of the documents used in this study did not fully justify the 
discrepancies. These discrepancies, particularly those regarding privacy protection and the 
importance of oversight and accountability, appear to confirm the direst predictions about 
the PATRIOT Act. While the most controversial sections have not been allowed to expire, 
they have also not been amended to provide additional oversight or accountability, and the 
NSA remains a wing of government almost wholly free from external review. Without the 
Snowden leaks, the program would still be entirely hidden from the public; NSA and other 
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programs like it are apparently exempt from the requirements of accountability and 
transparency that the reports, guidelines, and laws all portray as essential for democracy.  
Indeed, there were major discrepancies in the portrayal of accountability and 
transparency between the public and NSA documents. The reports and guidelines referred 
to the important roles that accountability and transparency play in protecting freedoms, 
and stated that neither the government nor the private sector should be exempt from these 
requirements. Moreover, the reports and guidelines written for the Obama administration 
professed a particular commitment to the principles of accountability of transparency and 
discussed a number of steps the administration has taken to ensure transparency. In 
addition, the Consumer Data Privacy Report also discussed how technology allows the 
government to more easily hold businesses accountable for upholding standards of data 
privacy protections. The laws, meanwhile, codified the privacy protections discussed in the 
reports and guidelines. The Freedom of Information Act, for example, set standards for 
governmental transparency and enabled citizens to access information collected about 
them. However, the PATRIOT Act was dissimilar from the other laws in this study because, 
while they all dealt with surveillance, the ECPA and the Privacy Act both elevated the 
importance of individual privacy protections while the PATRIOT Act limited privacy 
protections and expanded government surveillance, using the threat of terrorism as a 
justification. The laws used in this study were all created in response to specific events that 
demonstrated shortcomings in the existing legal frameworks. However, while the ECPA 
and Privacy Act were a response to public pressure for increased privacy protections, the 
PATRIOT Act was passed in a climate of instability and fear that followed the 9/11 attacks. 
That it expanded government surveillance powers where the earlier laws limited them 
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lends support to the Risk Society model, but also could be construed as supporting the 
control and surveillant assemblage explanations of the advance of government power and 
erosion of democratic safeguards and process. 
Where the Freedom of Information Act increased individual access to information 
that the government collects on them, the PATRIOT Act instead dictated that information 
collected on foreign nationals and suspected terrorists, or even information collected 
incidental to the pursuit of foreign nationals or suspected terrorists, is explicitly not subject 
to the protections given by the Freedom of Information Act. Furthermore, although the 
PATRIOT Act did include accountability and privacy protections, explicitly banning 
searches based solely on constitutionally protected rights and requiring law enforcement 
officers and agencies to track their investigations and report to Congress semi-annually, 
these are limited protections. James Clapper, the head of the NSA, lied to Congress in 2013 
about the collection of bulk data, a fact that only came to light because of the Snowden 
leaks. This raises serious questions about the effectiveness of the accountability provisions 
contained within the PATRIOT Act. Because only a small number of people are actually 
privy to the exact nature of governmental bulk data collection initiatives, standards of 
accountability and transparency are nearly impossible to enforce. Without evidence, lies 
are indistinguishable from facts and, in order to protect the ideals of privacy and 
transparency present in the reports and guidelines, provisions should be made to enhance 
accountability. 
Currently, the FISA Court, established to support the legality of covert data mining 
programs, is the only means of external oversight for the NSA program, and its work ends 
when it either grants or denies permission for searches. Since its creation, it has only 
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denied eleven of more than 33,900 (.03%) requests for surveillance (Eichelberger 2013) 
and the NSA documents raise serious questions about the extent of the government’s 
commitment to transparency, as well as the limitations of accountability in top-secret data 
mining initiatives. The NSA operates like a fourth branch of government, wholly opaque 
and subject to none of the checks and balances enshrined in the Constitution to protect the 
people from governmental overreach.  
The documents’ discussion of terrorism raised further questions about motives. 
Although in the public documents terrorism was really only discussed in the PATRIOT Act 
and “Safeguarding Privacy”, those two documents discussed it at such length, that it 
appeared to be a justification for unprecedented governmental surveillance. In the 
documents that discussed it, terrorist threats were presented as unprecedented: “This new 
threat is unlike anything the nation has faced before” (DOD 2004:1). This appeared to be 
deliberate framing and functioned as a powerful justification: since both modern 
technology and the threat the U.S. faces from terrorism are unprecedented, unprecedented 
uses of terrorism are justified. One explanation for this discrepancy is the timing of the 
documents: The PATRIOT Act was passed slightly over a month after the 9/11 attacks, and 
“Safeguarding Privacy” was written in 2004, when the attacks were still relatively fresh, 
thereby making terrorism a more evocative justification for amending freedoms and 
implementing dataveillance than at other points in time. Additionally, the change of 
Presidential administrations between those and later documents might also account for a 
change in focus.  
Moreover, risk prevention was a consistent theme across all four document 
categories. Discussions of technology were likewise prominently featured in all four 
document categories and often interwoven with discussions of risk prevention, but these 
discussions were not consistent between the public and NSA documents. As usual, the 
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reports and guidelines were consistent with each other, addressing similar aspects of 
technology and extolling the benefits of both technology and the data mining it facilitates. 
The reports and guidelines also acknowledged some of the controversy about privacy 
rights generated by governmental and corporate uses of technology and paid particular 
attention to the use of big data to stimulate economic productivity and growth. Meanwhile, 
the NSA documents’ discussion of the benefits and problems with technology centered not 
on ethical dilemmas, but rather ways of overcoming technological limitations that limit 
data collection. For example, while use/collection limitation is portrayed in the reports and 
guidelines as a method of protecting individual data privacy, in the NSA documents, the 
code was used in documents that described collection limitations as an obstacle to be 
overcome. The connotation of collection limitation in the NSA documents, therefore, was 
entirely negative, while in the reports and guidelines it was positive. Indeed, in the NSA 
documents all limitations on data collection were considered negative; the intent of the 
program, as described in the PowerPoints by its technicians, was to collect and store ever-
increasing amounts of data. Every technological advance that facilitated this was 
celebrated.  
While the justifications for collection and also the uses of the data by NSA adhered 
more strictly to the risk society model, the emphasis on collecting massive amounts of data 
adhered more closely to the control society theoretical model. Rather than the actuarial 
precision predicted by the risk society model, the NSA programs actually appeared to 
demonstrate the haphazard data collection predicted by the control society model. Both the 
risk society and control society models were suggested by the NSA’s analysis of its 
abundance of data with sophisticated tools and models, but their ultimate emphasis on 
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predicting and averting disaster through their unbridled data collection still indicates the 
risk society model. 
The risk society model was further suggested by the emphasis on crime prevention 
present in the reports, guidelines, laws and NSA documents. As represented in the reports 
and guidelines, the intent of surveillance was not to discipline or control the American 
population but rather prevent future undesirable events. Additionally, targets of 
surveillance in the NSA documents were foreign nationals and suspected terrorists, but the 
sheer volume of collected data implied that true control remains elusive, another important 
component of the risk society model. Control is elusive precisely because of the lack of 
oversight. While before, because of the relative difficulty of obtaining permission for them, 
searches used to be necessarily targeted, the staggering amount of information collected by 
the NSA program actually obscures useful data.  
The “cooperation and standardization” code was another demonstration of the 
thematic differences between the NSA documents and the public documents, but was more 
suggestive of the flows of information facilitated by technology than any specific theoretical 
surveillance model. A broad code, present across all four document categories, 
“cooperation and standardization” was applicable to many different aspects of big data 
collection and use. For example, the reports and guidelines suggested cooperation as a way 
to increase the potential of big data, and cooperation and standardization between 
government and private sector systems was encouraged, as was intra-governmental and 
industry-wide standardization. In the reports and guidelines, cooperation and 
standardization was further presented as having the potential to maximize economic 
potential, enhance privacy protection, and increase national security. However, its 
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representation in the NSA documents suggested both that this cooperation is not always 
voluntary, as in the case of the NSA directly tapping into company servers without the 
company’s consent, and potentially detrimental to civil liberties, as when intelligence 
agencies share information obtained under FISA with law enforcement officials, thereby 
circumventing Title III. 
The NSA documents demonstrated interest in legality further implied the risk 
society model. While, unlike in the reports and guidelines, there were no lengthy 
discussions of the trade-offs between benefits and drawbacks of technology, and there 
were only tangential references to privacy protection, such as discussions of “minimizing” 
data collected on American citizens, there were several references to following rules, laws 
and protocols. The NSA program did not appear to be run by a group of reckless 
lawbreakers, but debates about the morality of the program were wholly absent. Again, the 
documents were technical in nature and so discussions like those found in the reports and 
guidelines would be out of place. The interest in legality underscored the bureaucratic 
nature of the organization; these were not the people charged with writing the laws but 
rather the technicians who implemented the programs created by changes in laws. Still, the 
demonstrated interest in legality again suggested that, rather than a semi-nefarious 
attempt to control unruly populations, the NSA program is rather an example of a 
sprawling, disjointed government trying to prevent future risks.  
However, while the NSA documents included in this study indicate an interest in 
legality and use internal audits and enforcements to ensure compliance, the lack of external 
oversights individuate the program from the ideals presented in the reports and guidelines, 
and the lack of transparency and accountability itself constitutes a threat. While the 
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government extolled its attempts to regulate commercial collection and use of data in its 
official reports, the NSA documents demonstrated that governmental collection and use of 
data is similarly unregulated, and the government uses data collected in the private sector 
for purposes not intended at the time of its collection, making the government a 
questionable regulator.  
There were several other instances of framing throughout the data collected. 
Privacy was consistently portrayed as a fundamental American right and value across the 
reports, guidelines, and laws. Both the reports and guidelines made the case for extending 
American ideals of privacy to non-citizens, and Presidential administrations were 
portrayed as committed to upholding the privacy principle and all other constitutionally 
protected freedoms. It would be an admittedly hard sell to do otherwise, and stating in a 
public document that privacy is important and non-citizens deserve the same protections 
as citizens is not the same as codifying these protections through the legal system. In this 
case, what appeared more important was what was not said: while the reports and 
guidelines lauded steps taken to protect privacy, they omitted discussions of the steps 
taken to infringe upon existing privacy protections. Threats to privacy resulting from 
governmental uses of technology were likewise minimized. While threats were discussed, 
they were portrayed as resulting primarily from external parties. The American 
government was portrayed as committed to transparency and accountability and also as a 
protector of constitutional rights and freedoms. Top-secret surveillance programs were 
understandably not discussed, but leaks of previously confidential information were 
likewise ignored. The only report written after the Snowden leaks, The Big Data Report, 
was commissioned by President Obama in response to outcry resulting from the leaks but 
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mentioned them only once. Calling them an example of “insider threat,” the report lumped 
in Snowden with military personnel who attacked their own bases, entirely sidestepping 
the issue of his motivations, or the general reaction of the American public at discovering 
their government had been covertly collecting massive amounts of data from major 
Internet companies for years. The vague discussion of potential threats to privacy resulting 
from technology and big data in that report therefore seemed to be a way of appearing to 
address issues while sidestepping controversy. While the use of framing was not 
necessarily indicative of any theoretical model, it did suggest an attempt at controlling the 
perceptions and beliefs of the public and therefore appears to be more suggestive of the 
control society model than the risk society model. 
The NSA programs’ wide range of targets and demonstrably varied reasons for 
targeting individuals, corporations, and foreign nations for surveillance further indicated 
limitations to the applicability of the risk management model. The economic motivations 
and struggle for dominance in the world economy demonstrated in the NSA documents 
were more consistent with the Control Society model than the risk society model. Echoes of 
attempts at control were also demonstrated in the PATRIOT Act, particularly in Section 
1016, which discussed cyber and physical infrastructure maintenance necessary for, 
among other things, economic prosperity. It did not refer to the necessity of covert 
surveillance programs or corporate complicity to achieve these economic advantages but 
its emphasis on economic superiority, which was also present in the reports and guidelines, 
suggested less than wholly altruistic or fear-based motives for surveillance. Both the 
control society and risk society models apply to the findings of this study; neither was 
demonstrably incorrect. While the current state of surveillance resembles a risk society, 
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this study does not preclude the future possibility of a society that more closely resembles 
control society if the NSA programs continue as they are. Paradoxically, revelations about 
the NSA’s programs, by furthering individual perceptions of surveillance, may even speed 
this process causing individuals to modify their behavior, just like the prisoners did in 
Foucault’s Panopticon.  
Conclusion 
Contemporary surveillance is not only ubiquitous in contemporary society but is 
also increasingly palatable to the general public. While the government justifies its data 
collection by the presentation of threats, the public is already accustomed to willingly 
surrendering its information to online businesses in exchange for perceived rewards, 
something that the risk society model does not wholly predict. Meanwhile, while the 
heterogeneity of contemporary society suggests the futility of any kind of control model, 
incarceration rates in this country indicate that the government has not abandoned its 
attempts at control. However, the risk society model appeared to be the most appropriate 
theoretical model to explain the results of this qualitative analysis of the NSA’s surveillance 
program. While the inconsistencies between the public and private documents suggested 
deliberate attempts to frame, or control, the message received by the American public, 
indicating that aspects of the control society model are also present in post-9/11 
surveillance society, the unwieldy size of the programs, the implied and discussed threats 
present throughout the document categories, and the emphasis on preventing future 
undesirable events most strongly suggested the risk society model. As indicated by the 
literature, technology plays a large role in facilitating surveillance programs. However, 
without the precise convergence of a catastrophic terrorist attack and the subsequent 
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change in law, contemporary surveillance would not be possible (or, at least, legal). After 
9/11, a daily barrage of threats are presented to the American public—whether it be ISIS, 
or Al Qaeda, or nuclear weapons in Iran, or cyber attacks by China—and provide continuing 
justification for the existence of programs like the NSA’s. What used to be unthinkable has 
become routine and contemporary society is shaped by the ongoing, unending struggle to 
avert undesirable and unpredictable future events.  
Contemporary surveillance is complex in every way, its existence possible because of 
interconnected networks and unprecedented technology, but equally facilitated by social 
and legal changes. This study demonstrated the limitations of the existing legal system to 
protect privacy given the continuously and rapidly evolving nature of technology and the 
will to collect ever more data on more and more citizens, both foreign and domestic. The 
protections suggested in the reports and guidelines were practically unenforced, and the 
NSA was shown to operate as a wholly opaque branch of the government. The NSA’s 
surveillance programs were consistent with each of the theoretical models studied, lending 
credence to both. Still, the program substantively cannot enact the type of control 
consistent with either the control society or disciplinary model, and so the risk society was 
shown to be the most appropriate model to explain contemporary 9/11 surveillance. As 
technology progresses, however, so too will surveillance, creating the possibility that a 
control society will eclipse risk society. The most effective way of combatting this 
eventuality is the legal system; changes made or suggested outside this system lack the 
enforceability necessary for implementation. Further empirical studies of contemporary 
surveillance are also necessary to provide more data about the characteristics of specific 
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Appendix: NSA documents* 
 
NSA 1: In the Matter of Foreign Governments, Foreign Factions, Foreign Entities, and Foreign-
Based Political Organizations DNI/AG 702(g) Certification 2010-A. Contains a list of foreign 
governments “not recognized by the United States,” factions of foreign nations substantially 
not composed of U.S. persons, entities openly acknowledged by foreign governments, 
foreign-based political organizations, and entities controlled by foreign governments that 
are subject to U.S. dataveillance. 
 
NSA 2A, NSA 2B, NSA 2C: A list of frequently asked questions about Boundless Informant, 
this document has been declassified and explains what the program does. 
 
NSA 3A, NSA 3B, NSA 3C, NSA 3D: A PowerPoint for Global Access Operations explaining 
how Boundless Informant differs from previous programs, details about the program, and 
technical tips for executing the program. 
 
NSA 4: This graphic shows the amount of data collected each day for the last 30 days, the 
largest volume of records collected (6,142,932,557 records), and the top 5 techs. 
 
NSA 5: This document contains a map showing where data collection is available across the 
globe. 
 
NSA 6: Dated Jan 2008, this document includes an overview of records collected across the 
globe, including a breakdown of Digital Network Intelligence (DNI) and Dial Number 
Recognition (DNR) records collected by country. A pop-up detail shows that 203,190,032 
records have been collected in the United States. 
 
NSA 7: This document contains collection information for the United States, including 
project names, the top 5 projects, the top 5 validator IDs, and the top 5 IP addresses. 
 
NSA 8: This chart shows collection information for France for the last 30 days, including a 
graph broken down by day, the most volume and the top 5 techs. 
 
NSA 9: A review of October through December 2011, this document discusses CNE access 
to Belgacom GRX Operator. 
 
NSA 10: This document discusses VALIDATOR, a backdoor access program under FOXACID 
that targets Windows computers. 
 
NSA 11: This document discusses OLYMPUSFIRE, a software implant on Windows PC that 
provides the NSA 24/7 access to the targeted computers. 
 
NSA 12: QUANTUM, another program within the NSA’s surveillance program, is targeted 
for yahoo, Facebook, and static IP systems. A list of realms it can target is included. 
                                                        
* All documents received from TheIntercept.com  
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NSA 13A, NSA 13B, NSA 13C, NSA 13D, NSA 13E, NSA 13F: These documents contain 
illustrations how QUANTUM works.  
 
NSA 14: Another slide about QUANTUM, this document contains information on who can 
use the program and how targets are selected.  
 
NSA 15: Also about QUANTUM, this slide explains how to exploit web browsing with 
QUANTUM. 
 
NSA 16A, NSA 16B, NSA 16C, NSA 16D, NSA 16E, NSA 16F: These documents contain 
technical information about how to collect data using QUANTUM. 
 
NSA 17: This document discusses QUANTUMNATION and how it works.  
 
NSA 18A, NSA 18B: These documents contain technical information for using FOXACID. 
 
NSA 19: A graph showing collection information for Poland over the last 30 days, including 
a breakdown by days, the most information collected, and the top 5 techs.  
 
NSA 20: This PowerPoint slide shows the corporate cooperators and discusses same-day 
cooperation between the NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center (NTOC) and the FBI. 
 
NSA 21: This PowerPoint slide also shows the corporate cooperators and contains a 
graphic demonstrating how the NSA program works.  
 
NSA 22: This PowerPoint slide shows NSA Based Reporting June 2011-May 2012. 
 
NSA 23: This PowerPoint Presentation is an overview of NSA and how it works with the 
help of corporate collaborators.  
 
NSA 24: A week in the life of NSA reporting, this document shows a sampling of reporting 
topics from February 2-8, 2013 for Mexico, Japan, and Venezuela. 
 
NSA 25: This affidavit demonstrates how information collected through the use of 
dataveillance was used in a domestic criminal trial. 
 
NSA 26: This PowerPoint presentation contains an overview of the AURORAGOLD 
program: “The mission of the AURORAGOLD (AG) project is to maintain  data about 
international GSM/UMTS networks for the Wireless Portfolio Program Office  (WPMO), the 
Target Technology Trends Center (T3C/SG4), and their customers. Analysis of this  data 
supports:  a) An understanding of the current state,  b) Trending, or time-series analysis, 




NSA 27: A PowerPoint presentation on AURORAGOLD, this contains future technology 
trends, illustrations of how AURORAGOLD works, and goals for future data collection with 
AURORAGOLD. 
 
NSA 28: The AURORAGOLD working aid, this document contains technical information for 
using the program. 
 
NSA 29: Designed for the SIGDEV conference in June 2012, this presentation contains 
information about AURORAGOLD and why it should be more broadly used. 
 
NSA 30: This document contains the DTI’s strategic accomplishments for 2013 
 
NSA 31: This short memo addresses large router hacking and enumerates ways in which 
this ability can aid surveillance. 
 
NSA 32: This presentation demonstrates the acceleration of technology; detecting Network 
Operation Centers (NOC) is now automated.   
 
NSA 33: This presentation serves as a “roundtable,” discussing ways to improve data 
collection. 
 
NSA 34: Titled Mobile Networks in MyNOC World, this presentation contains technical 
information, a picture of Prince Charles and Camilla attending a presentation, and also 
evidence of collaboration to enable better exploitation of Belgacom. 
 
NSA 35: This report discusses NSA invisibility across 18 programs, including several anti-
virus softwares. 
 
NSA 36: Titled IR.21 – A Technology Warning Mechanism, this presentation discusses 
emerging models for trends and forecasting, wireless evolution paths, analytic frameworks, 
and AURORAGOLD. 
 
NSA 37: This memo is about sharing metadata beyond the NSA. 
 
NSA 38: This document is for employees being “indoctrinated” on SENTRYEAGLE, and 
contains information about that program. 
 
NSA 39: This is an administrator’s guide for Hacking Team: “The Hacking Suite for 
Governmental Interception.” 
 
NSA 40:  This is a system administrator’s guide for Hacking Team: “The Hacking Suite for 
Governmental Interception.” 
 




NSA 42: This is a technician’s guide for Hacking Team: “The Hacking Suite for 
Governmental Interception.” 
 
NSA 43: This presentation addresses sharing communications across the U.S. Intelligence 
community, a program called ICREACH. 
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